Recent Developments in Aviation Law by Koss, Hugh R. et al.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 65 | Issue 1 Article 3
1999
Recent Developments in Aviation Law
Hugh R. Koss
Michael L. Rodenbaugh
Eric C. Strain
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hugh R. Koss et al., Recent Developments in Aviation Law, 65 J. Air L. & Com. 3 (1999)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol65/iss1/3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LAW
HUGH R. Koss
MICHAEL L. RODENBAUGH
ERIc C. STRAIN*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 4
II. GENERAL ISSUES ................................. 5
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION .................. 5
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ............. 5
2. Removal of Cases ............................ 8
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION ......................... 9
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS ....................... 11
D. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION ..................... 12
E. CHOICE OF LAw ................................ 13
F. RECOVERABLE DAMAGES ......................... 14
G. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ............................. 16
H . EVIDENCE ....................................... 18
1. Admission of Evidence ....................... 18
2. Daubert and Expert Testimony ................ 19
3. Spoilation of Evidence ........................ 20
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS IN WARSAW
CONVENTION CARRIAGE ........................ 21
A. EXCLUSIVITY .................................... 21
B. EVENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
CONVENTION ................................... 22
C. INJURIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE
CONVENTION ................................... 23
D. WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY ....................................... 24
* Hugh Koss is a partner in the firm of Lillick & Charles, LLP, and resident in
their San Francisco office. Michael Rodenbaugh and Eric Strain are associates in
that office. Messrs. Koss and Rodenbaugh are members of Lillick's Aviation and
Product Liability Practice Group. The authors thank the Symposium Board and
the staff at the Journal for the honor of presenting this paper.
4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [65
IV. NON-WARSAW AIR CARRIER LIABILITY ......... 26
A. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT PREEMPTION ....... 26
1. Preemption .................................. 26
2. No Preemption ............................... 27
B. AIRLINE LIAILITY ............................... 30
1. Liability to Third Parties ..................... 30
2. Liability to Employees ........................ 31
V. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND
SU PPLIERS ........................................ 33
A. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES .................... 33
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE ........... 34
C. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE ..................... 35
VI. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES ............ 37
A. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT ..................... 37
1. Air Traffic Control Liability .................. 37
2. FTCA General Issues ......................... 37
B. REGULATORY CHALLENGES ...................... 39
1. Rulemaking and Findings Challenges ......... 39
2. Certificate Proceedings ........................ 41
VII. INSURANCE ....................................... 43
A. QUALIFICATION OF PILOTS ...................... 43
B. SCOPE OF COVERAGE ............................ 44
I. INTRODUCTION
D RAWING ON our own experience in using this article as an
updated practical reference, and on the legal reality that
trial court precedent truly is not, we present below seminal ap-
pellate authorities from the aviation arena from 1998. We also
present non-aviation appellate authorities having industry appli-
cation, and in footnotes give parenthetical treatment to trial
court aviation decisions of particular interest. We certainly do
not (and could not) cover the entire realm of "aviation law,"
and much less the realm of law affecting aviation. We apologize
for any decisions omitted for editorial or other reasons. We
hope what is offered is helpful to the practitioner.
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II. GENERAL ISSUES
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Second Circuit in Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indone-
sia1 addressed the scope of the "commercial activity" exception
to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 2 jurisdictional im-
munity. In this factually similar case to Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc.,5 the court held that the defendant bank's actions
in Indonesia in failing to pay on a letter of credit caused a "di-
rect effect" in the United States for purposes of the "commercial
activity" exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2), such that the bank
was subject to the jurisdiction of the Southern District of New
York.4 The plaintiff bank had been "entitled under the letter of
credit to indicate how it would be reimbursed, and it [had] des-
ignated payment to its bank account in New York.'
In a second antitrust case, Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A.,6
the court reaffirmed that it recognizes a "legally significant acts"
test for determining whether there has been a "direct effect" in
the United States within the meaning of the 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (2) "commercial activity" exception to immunity.7
This test requires that the conduct assertedly causing a "direct
effect" in the United States be "legally significant" to the claim
in order for the exception to apply.' The court also held that
the district court had not properly resolved the jurisdictional
question under the FSIA, finding that factual disputes existed as
to the defendant's "commercial activity" in the U.S. and abroad
as they related to the claim and therefore the district court had
erred in accepting the allegations in the complaint as a basis for
finding jurisdiction: "In these circumstances, the [district] court
should have looked outside the pleadings to the [parties'] sub-
missions, which both contradicted and supported the bare alle-
gations of jurisdiction pleaded in the complaint."9 The court
also noted that the district court could have held an evidentiary
1 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a) (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994).
3 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
4 See Hanil Bank, 148 F.3d at 131-32.
5 Id. at 132.
6 157 F.3d 922 (2d Cir. 1998).
7 Id. at 931.
8 See id. (citing Hanil Bank, 148 F.3d at 133).
9 Id. at 932.
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hearing to ascertain the facts of jurisdiction had it found one
warranted. °
In a case similar to Hanil Bank, the Fifth Circuit held in Voest-
Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China" that the Bank of
China's failure to remit funds to a domestic seller's designated
bank account in the United States caused a "direct effect" in the
United States, and thus the district court in Texas had jurisdic-
tion over the seller's action pursuant to the "commercial activ-
ity" exception.12 However, the court specifically rejected the
Second Circuit's "legally significant acts" test,13 finding that
nothing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 required that a
threshold "legally significant acts" element be proven.14
In Peri v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc.,'5 the court held that an Italian
"foreign state" manufacturer of a turbine designed and manu-
factured in Italy that exploded off the coast of Angola, killing
plaintiffs decedent, was immune from U.S. jurisdiction under
the FSIA because none of the 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) exceptions
applied. 16 The court specifically found that the second prong of
Section 1605(a) (2) did not apply because activities alleged to
have been engaged in by the defendant in the United States
were not connected to its design and manufacture of the tur-
bine, which was the basis of the alleged cause of action.17 The
court also found no waiver of the defendant's right to assert sov-
ereign immunity based on a clause in a contract that provided
for the application of Texas law.1 8 The court noted that such
implied waivers have been found only where a contract is be-
tween the parties suing and being sued,' 9 and that contractual
10 See id.
11 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 591 (1998).
12 Id. at 891-897.
13 See id. at 894-95 (citing decisions from the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits).
14 See id. at 895. Cf Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1993) (citing
the statute and requiring that the acts supporting a "commercial activity" excep-
tion to immunity be those which the alleged cause of action are "based upon").
15 150 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1033 (1999).
16 Id. at 479-81.
17 See id. at 481 (holding that "foreign policy concerns underlying sovereign
immunity do not necessarily disappear when a defendant loses its foreign [state]
status before suit is filed," and that the time of the defendant's actions which are
the basis of the suit control whether it is treated as a "foreign state" under the
FSIA).
18 See id. at 482.
19 See id. (citing Eckert Int'l v. The Gov't of the Sovereign Democratic Republic
of Fiji, 32 F.3d 77, 79-82 (4th Cir. 1994), Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of
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choice of law provisions do not ipso facto constitute an implicit
waiver of immunity under the FSIA.2°
In Theo. H. Davies & Co. v. Republic of the Marshall Islands,2' the
court reversed a district court judgment, holding instead that
under the FSIA, entities comprising a foreign state's water and
power utility lost their immunity from suit by virtue of repeated
purchases of generating equipment from a United States ven-
dor.22 The court found that the "foreign state" defendants had
for many years bought both goods and services from providers
doing business or located in the United States and had solicited
bids for the work at issue in Hawaii. 23 Agreements related to the
dispute, the alleged failure of a generator, were also negotiated
in Guam with meetings held in Hawaii. 24 In finding exceptions
to immunity, the Ninth Circuit agreed that "'doing busi-
ness' . . . can properly be used as a jurisdictional ground."2
Quoting Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit, the
court agreed:
[t]he FSIA's 'substantial contact' language... does not signal a
congressional intent to enact more stringent a test than the 'min-
imum contacts' necessary for 'doing business' jurisdic-
tion .... General personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity that
engages in substantial commercial activity in the United States is
authorized by the first clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).26
Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018,1022-23 (9th Cir. 1987), and Kramer v. Boeing Co., 705 F.
Supp. 1392, 1394-95 (D. Minn. 1989)).
20 See id.
21 174 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1998).
22 Id. at 975-76.
23 See id. at 974-75.
24 See id. at 975.
25 Id. at 976.
26 Id. (citing Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale
Algerienne De Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 206 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also Ahmed v.
United Airlines, Inc., No. C 97-4666 CW, 1998 WL 289294, at *1, 5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 1998) (dismissing action against a foreign air carrier wholly owned by
several Middle Eastern states for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA because the conduct complained of (the failure to warn of the need for a
visa) occurred abroad and plaintiff could show no "direct effect" in the United
States); Nazarian v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 989 F. Supp. 504, 507-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that passenger claims against airline for false imprison-
ment, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of ex-
press promise of hotel accommodations were not "based upon" the airline's
"commercial activity" in United States within meaning of the FSIA "commercial
activity" exception; also holding that negligence claim regarding airline's opera-
tion of its flight schedule was "based upon" airline's "commercial activity" in the
United States, but was nevertheless preempted by the ADA). Cf Rein v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 327-28, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1998),
1999]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. Removal of Cases
In Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.,27 the court dismissed
an appeal taken from a remand order issued pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 8 While the
court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal due
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), it also discussed the "government con-
tractor" defense as applied in the removal context.2 9 The court
stated that while the defendant had made a colorable claim as to
the application of the defense, it failed to establish the necessary
causal nexus between the conduct upon which the plaintiff's
claim of state law liability was based, an alleged failure to warn
concerning the dangers of exposure to an asbestos product, and
the conduct the defendant "allegedly performed under federal
direction" (a federal military contract obligation) .3 The court
also rejected the defendant's argument that because the district
court had based its remand analysis on a "policy considerations,"
section 1447(d)'s bar to review should not apply.31
In Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,3 2 the court af-
firmed a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant
Agent Orange manufacturers on statute of limitations
grounds. 33 In affirming the lower court's ruling, the Fifth Cir-
cuit also found that the defendant manufacturers had been enti-
tled to remove the action under the Federal Officer Removal
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), as the companies were "persons"
within the meaning of the statute, they had acted pursuant to a
federal officer's direction in manufacturing Agent Orange, and
a causal nexus existed between such federal officer's direction
and the product liability claims being asserted. 4 The court
affd in part, dismissed in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
2337 (1998) (holding that state sponsored terrorism exception to FSIA immunity
is not unconstitutional, nor was designation of state as sponsor of terrorism for
purposes of the Act; also finding personal jurisdiction over a foreign state, its
external security organization, and its national airline in connection with the al-
leged terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103).
27 153 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 1998).
28 Id. at 129-30.
29 See id. at 126-27.
3o See id. at 127.
31 See id. at 128-29 (noting that the district court's "policy considerations" anal-
ysis was an alternative basis for remand, and therefore not necessary to its
holding).
32 149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999).
33 Id. at 390, 404.
34 See id. at 398-400.
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noted that the Supreme Court has stated that "one of the most
important functions" of the right to remove under the Federal
Officer Removal Statute "is to allow a federal court to determine
the validity of an asserted official immunity defense."35
B. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products
Liability Litigation,6 the court held that the Pennsylvania district
court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a Louisiana court from pro-
ceeding in a similar case because the contemplated injunction
would affect a nationwide group of some 5.7 million people who
had settled claims with GM through the Louisiana proceeding
and require the district court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over them:
To be more precise, the Louisiana class members are not parties
before us; they have not constructively or affirmatively consented
to personal jurisdiction; and they do not, as far as has been
demonstrated, have minimum contacts with Pennsylvania.
Therefore, due process deprives us of personal jurisdiction and
prevents us from issuing the injunction prayed for by
appellants.3
7
In Caribbean Broadcasting System, Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC,3 8
the court held that the district court had not abused its discre-
tion in dismissing a foreign radio station owner's antitrust action
against a competitor for lack of personal jurisdiction without al-
lowing the owner to conduct jurisdictional discovery.39 The
court relied on the fact that the plaintiff had failed to dispute
the defendant's affidavit that it neither solicited business in the
jurisdiction, nor made telephone calls to the jurisdiction:
35 Id., at 397 (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 (1969) and Ari-
zona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242 (1981)). Cf Carroll v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 516, 522 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding defendant airline's diversity
removal of a personal injury case untimely because, although the complaint did
not allege $75,000 in damages, allegations of serious injuries and "wilful miscon-
duct" under the Warsaw Convention (so as to breach the Convention's $75,000
liability limitation) triggered removal period); Godner-Abravanel v. American
Airlines, No. C 98-1772 SI, 1998 WL 456273, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 1998)
(remanding to state court where airline had sought to strike plaintiff's punitive
damages claim prior to removal).
36 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
37 Id. at 141.
38 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
39 Id. at 1089-91.
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Because there was no indication before the court that CCC had
any contacts at all with the District of Columbia, let alone the
minimum contacts necessary for the court, consonant with due
process, to exercise personal jurisdiction over it, CCC argues that
any discovery would have been inappropriate .... As CCC re-
joins, however, in order to get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff
must have at least a good faith belief that such discovery will en-
able it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.4 °
In Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited,41 the court
found that the foreign manufacturer of a grain elevator safety
device had sufficient contacts with the State of Iowa to permit
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in a product liability
action brought by a worker injured in a grain dust explosion.42
The manufacturer had designed the device at issue for United
States markets, had agreed to distribute the device through a
distributor located near the Iowa border, and had sold 619 of
the safety devices to the distributor, eighty-one of which were
sold in Iowa.43 Under these circumstances, the court held that
the defendant had purposely directed its activities at residents of
the forum, and that claims resulting from alleged injuries which
arose out of those activities were properly litigated in Iowa.44
The court also held that when a district court has resolved a
personal jurisdiction issue without an evidentiary hearing, the
court of appeals reviews de novo whether the plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing of jurisdiction, viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to it.45
In Pennzoil Products Co. v. Colelli & Associates,46 the court held
that the standard of review for factual findings made by the dis-
trict court pertaining to personal jurisdiction is "clear error. 4 v
The court also held that under Pennsylvania's long-arm statute,
which permits the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents to
the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the district court had jurisdiction over an
40 Id. at 1089-90 (citing several decisions).
41 148 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., 119 S. Ct. 543 (1998).
42 See id. at 945, 947-48.
43 See id. at 948.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 948 (citing Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d
1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1991)).
46 149 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998).
47 Id. at 200 (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d
1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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Ohio producer of solvents used by oil producers in that state,
which then sold their crude containing the solvent to a Penn-
sylvania refinery allegedly causing injury in that state.4"
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,49 the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of an action aris-
ing from an airplane crash in France that killed a French citi-
zen.50 Supporting its affirmance, the court agreed with the
district court that French law would apply to the action, that the
French court system would provide adequate procedures and an
adequate remedy, and that the "private interest" factors weighed
in favor of a French forum because most of the evidence rele-
vant to the defendant's claims of contributory negligence (i.e.,
that the pilot may have committed suicide) was more readily
available in France.51 The district court had also imposed condi-
tions on the dismissal to ensure access to evidence in France and
to at least partially ameliorate limitations concerns. 2
In Gemini Capital Group, Inc. v. Yap Fishing Corp.,53 the court
affirmed the dismissal of a tuna industry business dispute action
against a "foreign state" on grounds of forum non conveniens in
favor of litigation in the courts of the State of Yap, Federated
States of Micronesia.54 In so affirming, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court had not erred in according the plaintiffs'
choice of forum less deference than that accorded a Hawaiian
resident suing in his or her home state, nor did the district court
48 See id. at 203-08 (analyzing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987) and the Supreme Court's discussion of the "stream-of-com-
merce" theory, as well as post-Asahi decisions addressing the issue); see also Ray-
theon Aircraft Credit Corp. v. Starship Enterprises, Inc., No. 97-1226-WEB, 1998
WL 166582, at *1-2, 4 (D. Kan. Mar. 20, 1998) (denying a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction because the defendant's action "in accepting deliv-
ery of the aircraft in Kansas and ferrying it to Nevada qualif[ied] as transacting
business within [Kansas]"); Trans Nat'l Travel, Inc. v. Sun Pacific Int'l, Inc.,
10 F. Supp. 2d 79, 81-83 (D. Mass. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for improper venue, holding that the actions of an Ari-
zona air carrier that negotiated a contract with a Massachusetts corporation and
provided services in Massachusetts constituted "sufficient minimum contacts"
with Massachusetts).
- 161 F.3d 602 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1755 (1999).
50 Id. at 604.
51 See id. at 609-10.
52 See id. at 605.
53 150 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1998).
54 See id. at 1090-95.
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err in refusing to accord plaintiffs' choice heightened deference
because the alternative forum was a foreign one.5 The court
also found that the district court had not erred in concluding
that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they would be treated
unfairly by either the Yap or Micronesian courts.56
D. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
In Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach the
Supreme Court held that a district court to which cases have
been transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for pretrial pro-
ceedings cannot, after conclusion of those proceedings, transfer
the case to itself for trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).58 The
Court thus ended the patchwork of decisions "self-transferring"
cases for trial or refusing to do so. In a fairly straightforward
analysis, the Court relied primarily on the language of the mul-
tidistrict statute itself, which unequivocally mandates that ac-
tions transferred under it "shall be remanded by the
[multidistrict litigation] panel at or before the conclusion of...
pretrial proceedings." 9 The Court reasoned that "no exercise
in rulemaking can read that obligation out of the statute."60
The Court did not, however, address the separate issue of the
55 See id. at 1091-92 (discussing Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255
(1981)).
56 See id. at 1092-93; see also Potomac Capital Investment Corp. v. KLM N.V.,
No. 97 Civ. 8141 (AJP) (RLC), 1998 WL 92416, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1998) (dis-
missing negligent repair of aircraft engine action for forum non conveniens where
repair occurred in the Netherlands and the engine failed over navigable waters
while the airplane was flying from Senegal to Brazil). Cf Aero Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v.
Opron, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993-94, 998 (D. Minn. 1998) (denying motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, and holding
that a Quebec defendant negotiated a contract and corresponded with a Minne-
sota plaintiff and thus "actively nurtured and fostered a continuous business rela-
tionship" with the plaintiff through activities conducted in Minnesota); United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 796, 797-800 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(denying defendant's motion to transfer venue to California and instead defer-
ring to United's choice of a Chicago forum in a dispute against one of its "United
Express" carriers); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., No. C-1-95-375, 1998
WL 54976, at *1-3 (S.D. OhioJan. 21, 1998) (denying Boeing's motion to transfer
venue to Pennsylvania where its helicopter manufacturing facilities were located,
and holding that a whisteblower's False Claims Act suit should stay where it had
been pending for two years, a district which also had contacts relevant to the
action).
57 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
58 Id. at 959.
59 Id. at 962 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)).
60 Id. at 963.
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propriety of a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer subsequent to re-
mand by the Judicial Panel.
Following Lexecon, the Second Circuit in Shah v. Pan American
World Services, Inc.,6" held that the Supreme Court's rationale
should apply equally to district court "self-transfers" under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b) (5), a bankruptcy venue statute.62 In Shah, the
court considered whether a judgment entered against plaintiff
airline passengers and passenger survivors should be vacated
under Lexecon, in light of the multidistrict transferee court's
"self-transfer" of the matter following pretrial proceedings.63
While the record showed the district court's "self-transfer" had
been made under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),64 the defendants argued
that transfer had actually been effectuated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b) (5) which they claimed allowed "self-transfer." 65 Not-
ing that the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon was not pre-
mised upon whether § 1404(a) alone allowed for "self-transfer,"
the Second Circuit reasoned that the requirement of remand by
the Judicial Panel was made necessary by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 irre-
spective of a district court's power to transfer under § 157(b) (5)
or any other venue provision.66 The Second Circuit went on to
hold, however, that Lexecon should not be applied retroactively
to the case, denying plaintiffs relief.67
E. CHOICE OF LAW
In Curley v. AMR Corp.,68 a passenger sued an airline and its
employees for negligence, gross negligence and false imprison-
61 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub. nom., 119 S. Ct. 1033 (1999), cert.
denied sub. nom., 119 S. Ct. 1034 (1999).
62 Id. at 90-91.
63 See id. at 88-89.
64 While this arguably renders the Shah discussion of Lexecon, as applied to
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (5), dicta, the court's analysis is well-reasoned
in light of the plain language of the multidistrict transfer statute.
65 See Shah, 148 F.3d at 90-91.
- See id. at 91.
In short, Lexecon and § 1407 require that the MDL panel remand to
the transferor court any action 'at or before the conclusion of...
pretrial proceedings,' and any further transfers of venue for trial
under any statute must follow such remand. Whether, after remand
to the transferor court, a court has the power to transfer venue to
itself under § 1404(a) or § 157(b)(5) is a separate issue that we
have no need to decide.
Id.
67 See id. at 91-92.
68 153 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ment, alleging that he was detained and searched by Mexican
authorities after being falsely identified as having smoked mari-
juana during a flight from New York to Mexico. 69 Applying New
York choice of law principles, the court stated that district courts
should invoke flexible procedures in the determination of for-
eign law, through any relevant material or source, whether or
not admissible in evidence. 0 After finding that a true conflict
existed and that Mexican law applied to the claims based on the
carrier's employees' actions and the passenger's detention in
Mexico, the court held that neither the airline nor its employees
were liable under Mexican civil law because they had not acted
"illicitly or against good customs and habits" by informing Mexi-
can authorities of their suspicion that the plaintiff had smoked
marijuana during the flight.7" To the contrary, the airline and
its employees acted in "compliance with specific regulatory re-
quirements governing the conduct ... of aircraft in Mexican
airspace," and no requirements existed that airline employees
question or search passengers before reporting such suspicions
to authorities.72
F. RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
In Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co.,73 the Supreme Court laid to
rest the issue of whether the Death on the High Seas Act"
(DOHSA), allows recovery of pre-death pain and suffering dam-
ages through the mechanism of a survival action under the gen-
eral maritime law, holding that it does not.75 Dooley arose out of
the September 1, 1983 Korean Airlines Flight KE007 shoot down
accident over the Sea of Japan. Both the district court and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit had agreed with KAL that DOHSA did
not allow recovery of non-pecuniary damages, including the
69 Id. at 9-10.
70 See id. at 13 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(1)).
71 See id. at 9, 15-16.
72 Id. at 15-16; see also Kangiser v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., Southern District of
Florida Civil No. 95-2388-CIV-GRAHAM (S.D. Fla. Order of August 3, 1998)
(holding that applicable Colombian civil law (as determined based upon dece-
dents' domicile) very severely limited the damages recoverable in a United States
air crash wrongful death case). Cf In reAir Crash Near Cali, Columbia on Decem-
ber 20, 1995, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1345-46 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (applying Florida
damages law in Columbian air crash case, in part based on finding that the law of
Columbia was too difficult to ascertain).
73 118 S. Ct. 1890 (1998).
74 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761 (1994).
75 See Dooley, 118 S. Ct. at 1892.
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plaintiffs' claims for their decedents' alleged pre-death pain and
suffering. 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict between the circuits created by Gray v. Lockheed Aeronau-
tical Systems, Co.77 Citing 46 U.S.C. App. § 762, providing for the
recovery under DOHSA of "pecuniary damages," and following
its earlier decisions in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire78 and
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,79 the Court held that Congress
was clear in its specification of potential claimants and recover-
able damages under DOHSA, which does not include either de-
cedents' estates as claimants, by way of a survival action, or
decedents' non-pecuniary damages. 80
The Second Circuit followed Dooley in an unpublished opin-
ion in Tandon v. United Air Lines.81 In Tandon, the court issued a
summary order affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs claims
for non-pecuniary losses arising out of a death occurring aboard
a commercial aircraft over the high seas. 2
76 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 935 F. Supp. 10, 15
(D.D.C. 1996), affd, 117 F.3d 1477, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997), affd, 524 U.S. 116
(1998).
77 125 F.3d 1371, 1385 (11th Cir. 1997) (allowing recovery through a survival
action under the general maritime law), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2317
(1998). The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Gray followed earlier circuit court deci-
sions essentially finding that since DOHSA is literally silent as to exclusivity, sup-
plementation through the mechanism of an extra-statutory survival action is not
prohibited by the Act. 125 F.3d at 1385-86 (citing Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d
794, 800 (1st Cir. 1974) and Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr. & Assoc., 466 F.2d
903, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1972)).
78 477 U.S. 207, 232-33 (1986) (holding that DOHSA remedies may not be
supplemented by state law to allow recovery of loss of society damages).
79 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978) (holding that DOHSA remedies may not be
supplemented by the general maritime law to allow recovery of loss of society
damages).
80 See Dooley, 118 S. Ct. at 1895. "By authorizing only certain surviving relatives
to recover damages, and by limiting damages to the pecuniary losses sustained by
those relatives, Congress provided the exclusive recovery for deaths that occur on
the high seas." Id. ("Because Congress has chosen not to authorize a survival
action for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, there can be no general
maritime survival action for such damages.").
81 159 F.3d 1348 (2d Cir. 1998).
82 See Tandon, No. 97-9058, 1998 WL 538102 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 1998) (unpub-
lished); Cf In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York on July 17, 1996, No. 96
Civ. 7986 (RWS), MDL 1161 (RWS), 1998 WL 292333, at *1, 3, 7, 11 (S.D.N.Y.
June 2, 1998) (finding DOHSA inapplicable to claims arising from the in-flight
break-up of TWA Flight 800 some eight miles off Long Island because DOSHA's
application to deaths occurring on "the high seas beyond a marine league" re-
quires that such claims arise both on the "high seas" and "beyond a marine
league" from shore to implicate the Act). The district court reasoned that to
accept the defendants' argument that the statute defines "high seas" as being
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In Air Transport Ass'n of Canada v. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, 3 the court held that the Air Transport Association of Can-
ada was entitled to attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act 84 stemming from the group's successful challenge of
overflight fees assessed by the FAA against foreign air carriers.85
The court found the award of attorneys' fees justified because,
contrary to the FAA's assertion, the overflight fee schedule at
issue was not substantially justified.86 No special circumstances
made the fee award unjust, moreover, as the Air Transport Asso-
ciation of Canada claimed only fees which were associated with
the issue on which it prevailed and had fully documented its
claim.8 7
G. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,88 the Fifth Circuit, apply-
ing Texas law in a non-aviation product liability case, held that a
punitive damages "multiplier" of $3 for every $1 of actual dam-
ages awarded against an asbestos manufacturer in a class action
was not excessive.89 In so doing, the court upheld the use of a
"multiplier" to determine punitive damages, and rejected the
defendant's due process argument that the overall award was
excessive.9" The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that
under Texas law the punitive damages multiplier should also ap-
ply to prejudgment interest awarded by the trial court.91 Finally,
the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that one of the de-
fendants should be held jointly liable for the exemplary dam-
beyond one marine league (i.e. three nautical miles) would render the latter
phrase surplusage, contrary to basic tenets of statutory construction. Id. at 3. To
arrive at its holding, the court also addressed whether DOHSA incorporates in
the definition of "high seas" the twelve nautical mile United States territorial
limit created by President Reagan's 1988 Proclamation (No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg.
777 (1988)), holding that it does. See id. at *11.
83 156 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
84 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994).
85 Air Transport Ass'n of Can., 156 F.3d at 1330-31.
86 See id. at 1330-33.
87 See id. at 1333-35; see also Moldawsky v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d
533, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (reducing damage awards to teenage and adult chil-
dren of passengers killed in airline crash, holding that New York pecuniary dam-
ages law required both reasonable compensation and consideration of the age
and degree of dependency of the children).
88 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
89 Id. at 323-24.
90 See id. at 323.
91 See id. at 324-25 (analyzing Texas decisions).
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ages assessed against a bankrupt co-defendant. 92 The court
noted that the defendants had not acted jointly to commit a sin-
gle wrong, but rather had acted separately, and the jury had also
considered the issue of punitive damages separately as to each.
93
In Grabinski v. Blue Springs Ford Sales, Inc.,94 the Eighth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part in an action brought by an
automobile purchaser against a dealership and dealership em-
ployees alleging fraud in violation of the Missouri Merchandis-
ing Practices Act.9 5 Partially reversing, the court held with
respect to punitive damages claims that the district court was
required under both federal and Missouri law to review awards
for excessiveness upon motion of a party.96 In so holding, the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the court of appeals
itself should conduct a review for excessiveness by applying the
principles laid out in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 7
Rather, the court held that the matter was controlled by Gasper-
ini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,98 which the Eighth Circuit read
as concluding that district courts, and not the courts of appeals,
have primary responsibility for review of allegedly excessive jury
verdicts. 99 The court also cited the practical considerations sup-
porting its holding, parroting the Supreme Court's recognition
in Gasperini that "[t]rial judges have the unique opportunity to
consider the evidence in the living courtroom context ... while
appellate judges see only the cold paper record."10°
In January 1998 the Missouri Supreme Court denied review in
Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp.101 and Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme
Turbomeca France,'1 2 letting stand two remitted, yet still very sig-
nificant, compensatory and punitive damage judgments entered
against a helicopter engine manufacturer in personal injury and
wrongful death cases after trial by jury.10 In Letz, a remitted
92 See id. at 325-27.
93 See id. at 326-27.
94 136 F.3d 565 (8th Cir. 1998).
- See id. at 566-68.
96 See id. at 571-72.
97 517 U.S. 559, 562, 575, 577-81 (1996).
98 518 U.S. 415, 434-39 (1996).
- See Grabinski, 136 F.3d at 572.
-oo Id. (noting also Gasperini's directive that appellate consideration of trial
court determinations regarding excessiveness is limited to review for abuse of
discretion) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
101 975 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
102 963 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 75 (1998).
1o3 See id. at 645, 669.
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compensatory award of $2.5 million and punitive award of $26.5
million were allowed to stand. 10 4 In Barnett, a compensatory
award remitted to $3.5 million and a punitive award remitted to
$26.5 million were allowed to stand. 10 5
H. EVIDENCE
1. Admission of Evidence
In Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc.,1 °6 a pilot's widow
and children brought a wrongful death and survival action
against the company for which the decedent had been con-
ducting aerial surveys when he was killed. 10 7 Among other evi-
dentiary issues addressed by the Fifth Circuit, the court held that
a former employee of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) could properly testify as an expert witness in the case
even though he had worked in the NTSB field office that investi-
gated the accident.108 After analyzing NTSB regulations cover-
ing testimony by Board employees,10 9 the court found that
allowing the testimony at issue would not offend their spirit be-
cause the opinions offered were not formulated as part of the
witness's official duties with the NTSB, the witness had no inves-
tigative function regarding the accident, and the fact that he
had worked in the NTSB field office that investigated the subject
crash, without more, was insufficient cause to disallow the testi-
mony. 10 That the witness had testified at trial that he worked
for the NTSB also did not change the Fifth Circuit's view. 1'
The court noted that there was "no mention .. .made of [the
witness's] connection to the investigating office, and [the wit-
ness had also] clearly testified that he was retired from the
NTSB." I12 The court did admonish, however, "that on retrial
[the defendant] would be well advised to avoid making a show
of [the witness's] NTSB lapel pin."" 3
104 975 S.W.2d at 180.
105 963 S.W.2d at 669; Cf In reAircrash Disaster Near Monroe, Mich., on Janu-
ary 9, 1997, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1112-13 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that Michi-
gan law applied to bar recovery of punitive damages against an air carrier and an
aircraft manufacturer in actions arising from a fatal accident in Michigan).
106 138 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1998).
107 See id. at 999.
108 See id. at 1001-02.
109 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 835 (1998).
110 See Campbell, 138 F. 3d at 1002.
111 See id.
112 Id.
13 Id. at 1002 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998).
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Addressing the separate issue of the pilot's alleged violations
of Federal Aviation Regulations, the court held that on retrial
the defendant "should [not] be precluded from presenting [rel-
evant regulations] to the jury as evidence of what a reasonable
pilot would have done under [similar] circumstances."114 The
court found that "[e]ven if a violation of a regulation does not
constitute negligence per se ... [it might] still provide evidence
that [a party] deviated from the applicable standard of care."'"15
Finally, the court also addressed the issue of whether testi-
mony or photographs of the decedent's remains should be ad-
mitted to show the extent of the mental anguish suffered by his
family members. 1 6 In addressing specific items of evidence, the
court affirmed the district court's decision to bar admission of
photographs of the decedent's decapitated remains under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403 to avoid a potentially visceral response
by the jury." 7 The court also held, however, that testimony re-
garding the condition of the decedent's remains would be ad-
missible.118 The evidence was assertedly relevant to the issue of
the mental anguish suffered by the decedent's survivors, and the
testimony alone would probably not have the same prejudicial
impact on jurors that photographic depictions might.' 9
2. Daubert and Expert Testimony
In Desrosiers v. Right International of Florida Inc.,2 ° the court
held in an airplane crash case, inter alia, that the admissibility of
testimony of an accident reconstruction expert, being "techni-
cal" rather than "scientific" in nature, was not governed by
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 21 but instead by Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 702 and 703 generally.' 22 The
court distinguished as dicta language in other decisions indicat-
ing that Daubert's analysis applies to "technical" evidence as
well. 123 The court also held that the admission of only portions
114 Id. at 1003.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 1003-04.
117 See id. at 1004.
118 See id. at 1005.
119 See id. at 1004-05.
120 156 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).
121 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993).
122 See Desrosiers, 156 F.3d at 960-63.
123 See id. at 960 n.9.
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of aJAG report on the accident deemed trustworthy by the trial
court was proper. 124
3. Spoilation of Evidence
In Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Service, Inc.,125
an unpublished decision, the court affirmed dismissal of an ac-
tion due to spoilation of evidence which was "so prejudic[ial to
the defense] that no lesser sanction would insure ...a fair
trial.' 26 Plaintiffs claims arose out of the purchase of a Cessna
twin-engine airplane. While landing the aircraft after purchase,
the main landing gear collapsed. Plaintiff then filed suit alleg-
ing breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and
product liability based on the collapse of the gear and various
other alleged defects in the aircraft. Prior to trial, all but one of
the component parts of the failed gear were lost or destroyed.127
After analyzing numerous decisions imposing sanctions on a
party for failing to preserve evidence, the court held that the
sanction of dismissal was appropriate, adopting the district
court's reasoning that a lesser sanction (an adverse inference
instruction) would not provide a fair trial which could only have
come from the view and inspection of the components. 12
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court,129 the Supreme
Court of California held that there is no California state law tort
remedy for the intentional spoilation of evidence by a party if
the victim knew or should have known of the matter before a
decision on the merits of the underlying claim is rendered. 130
Cedars-Sinai arose out of an injury to a child during birth. Plain-
tiffs contended that the defendant hospital had intentionally de-
stroyed evidence relevant to the malpractice action that ensued
and brought a separate cause of action in tort sounding in "in-
tentional spoilation-that is, intentional destruction or suppres-
sion-of evidence." 13 1 In holding that no such independent
124 See id. at 961-62 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163-64
(1988) andJohnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that public records covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C) can be
challenged as untrustworthy)).
125 139 F.3d 912, No. 97-5089, 1998 WL 68879, *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998)
(unpublished).
126 Id. at *1.
127 See id. at *1-2.
128 See id. at *7.
129 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
130 See id. at 512.
131 See id. at 512-13.
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tort existed, at least in the situation where the victim discovers
the conduct prior to adjudication of the underlying claim, the
court found that non-tort remedies for spoilation (such as sanc-
tions and cautionary instructions) were both extensive and effec-
tive to deter such conduct and to remedy it should it occur. 32
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS IN WARSAW
CONVENTION CARRIAGE
A. EXCLUSIVITY
In Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc., 3 the Second Cir-
cuit made various pronouncements of interest under the War-
saw Convention. 34 Shah arose out of the September 1986
hijacking of Pan American Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan that
lead to almost two dozen deaths and numerous injuries. Funda-
mentally, the case presented the issue of whether an air carrier's
fraudulent misrepresentations could constitute "wilful miscon-
duct" so as to make inapplicable the Convention's liability limi-
tation."3 5 Plaintiffs alleged that Pan Am had falsely represented
that it had embarked on an enhanced security program, which
was claimed to have induced the plaintiffs or their decedents to
fly. 136
Addressing Convention exclusivity, the court found that all of
the plaintiffs' state law claims "for rescission, negligence, wrong-
ful death, conspiracy to defraud, breach of contract, and fraud
[were] ... 'within the scope' of Article 17 of the Convention, in
that they all [sought] damages for 'the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger'
caused by an 'accident' . . . in international [air] transporta-
tion." Thus, all such claims were preempted by the
Convention.13 7
132 See id. at 520-21.
133 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Singh v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1033 (1999) and cert. denied sub nom. Patel v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1034 (1999).
134 See id. at 88 (citing the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, TS
No. 876 (1934), reprinted in, 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (1997)).
135 See id. at 88-90.
136 See id.
137 Id. at 97-98 (citing Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 141 (2d
Cir. 1998) and Coker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 950 F.2d 839, 847 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
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In Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,138 the court addressed
whether a plaintiff passenger had suffered an "accident" under
Article 17 of the Convention, holding that she had not because
the allegedly wrongful body search conducted was part of the
carrier's normal operations and was not carried out in an unrea-
sonable manner. Certiorari was granted in Tseng,139 ostensibly
for review of the Convention exclusivity (preemption) issue in
the case where no "accident" under the Convention occurs.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the matter on No-
vember 10, 1998, and found exclusivity. 140
B. EVENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
In Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 41 the Second Circuit held
that the "accident" necessary to implicate Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention could be one resulting from an airline's normal
operations or routine procedures in the operation of an aircraft
if those operations or procedures are carried out in an unrea-
sonable manner.4 2 In Fishman, a child passenger was injured
when a flight attendant, attempting to soothe the child's ear-
ache with a hot compress, spilled scalding water on the child's
neck and shoulders.143 Rejecting the argument that the inci-
dent was not an "accident" because it arose in the course of the
airline's normal operations, the court also reaffirmed that state
law claims for passenger injury or death cognizable under Arti-
cle 17 are preempted by the Convention. 1" It also noted that
claims for purely emotional injuries are also encompassed by Ar-
ticle 17, and are unrecoverable as a matter of the law of the
Convention. 145
138 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998), revd
sub nom., 119 S. Ct. 662 (1999).
139 118 S. Ct. 1793, 1793 (1998).
140 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
141 132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
142 Id. at 141-43.
143 See id. at 140.
144 See id. at 142 (citing In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dec. 21,
1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1273-76, 1282 (2d Cir. 1991)).
145 See Fishman, 132 F.3d at 142 (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S.
530, 534 (1991)); see also Dias v. Transbrasil Airlines, Inc., 26 Av. Cas. (CCH)
16048, 16049 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that poor cabin air was an "accident"
under the Convention); Goodwin v. Air France, No. C 97-1997 FMS, *1 (N.D. Cal.
June 2, 1998) (holding that "as a matter of law, an attack by a fellow passenger
can constitute an 'accident' under the Warsaw Convention"); Ratnaswamy v. Air
Afrique, No. 95 C 7670, 1998 WL 111652, at *3-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 1998) (deny-
ing airline's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that a claim arising
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C. INJURIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
In Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,'46 plaintiff sued
under the Warsaw Convention for recovery of claimed emo-
tional distress damages-post-traumatic stress and anorexia-al-
legedly caused when she and all passengers were advised by the
aircraft's captain that a nonspecific and uncredible bomb threat
had been made against various targets including the plane.147
Relying on Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,'48 the Third Circuit af-
firmed a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant
airline on the basis that plaintiff had failed to allege the requi-
site "bodily injury" necessary to obtain relief under the Conven-
tion. 149 Plaintiff had argued, seizing on a passage from Floyd,
that the weight loss she suffered subsequent to the event was
sufficient "physical manifestation of injury" to recover.150 The
court of appeals disagreed, finding that the Supreme Court's
reference in Floyd to "physical manifestation of injury" could
only have meant "bodily injury" in fact, and not psychic or psy-
chosomatic injuries held barred by that very decision.' 5 1 The
court noted that the plaintiffs in Floyd had also allegedly suffered
sleeplessness, arguably a physical manifestation of emotional
injury.152
from severe delay upon return from Senegal constituted an "accident" and that
state law claims were thus preempted by the Convention). Cf Gotz v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-05 (D. Mass. 1998) (granting Delta's motion
for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's entire claim, holding that plain-
tiff must prove "a malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's operation" as one
of two elements of an "accident" under the Convention, and that the actions of
an independent, third party passenger do not fall within the scope of an aircraft's
operation); Brown v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-CV-7238, 1998 WL 634901,
at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1998) (holding that couple injured in the crash of an
airport shuttle were entitled to seek punitive damages because the Convention,
including its prohibition of punitive damages, did not apply to a claim that did
not arise from the "embarking or disembarking from [an aircraft]" and therefore
was not an "accident").
146 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
147 See id. at 109.
148 499 U.S. 530, 534-35 (1991) (holding that the Warsaw Convention's origi-
nal French "lesion corporelle," translated as "bodily injury," does not encompass
purely psychic injuries).
149 See Terraftanca, 151 F.3d at 110.
150 Id. at 111 (quoting Royd, 499 U.S. at 552).
151 See id.
152 See id.
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D. WILFUL MISCONDUCT AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
In Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc.,' 53 the Second Cir-
cuit addressed specifically the issue of whether air carrier fraud-
ulent misrepresentations could constitute "wilful misconduct" so
as to make inapplicable the Convention's liability limitation.154
Addressing alleged air carrier misrepresentations of increased
security which were claimed to have induced travel, the court
held that such conduct by an air carrier (via advertising or
otherwise), which induces a passenger to purchase a ticket for
carriage, may constitute "wilful misconduct" if the carrier "acted
either (1) with knowledge that its actions would probably result
in injury or death, or (2) in conscious or reckless disregard of
the fact that death or injury would be the probable consequence
of its actions."' 5
The court also addressed the issue of the Convention's causa-
tion element necessary for the imposition of liability for fraud-
based "wilful misconduct," noting it to be one of first impression
in the United States. 15 6 After recognizing three possible inter-
pretations of the causation language of Article 25 as applied to
fraud-based "wilful misconduct," the court held that to establish
causation in such circumstances a plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence first that its reasonable reliance on
the misrepresentation induced carriage and, second, that the
damage would not have occurred if the carrier had performed
as promised.'57
153 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
154 Id. at 93.
155 Id. (citing In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on Dece. 21, 1998, 37
F.3d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (defining "wilful misconduct" under the
Convention)).
156 See id., 148 F.3d at 93-96.
157 See id. at 94-95; see also American Home Assurance Co. v. Jacky Maeder
(Hong Kong) Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 5154 (LAK), 1998 WL 213194, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 29, 1998) (holding cargo carrier liable for $250,000 worth of stolen watches
without application of Warsaw Convention liability limits, because "agreed stop-
ping places" were not sufficiently stated in waybill because it did not contain cor-
rect flight number and thus reference to carrier's timetables was insufficient to
notify sender of the agreed stopping places). Cf Yanovskiy v. Air France, No. 98
Civ. 0174 (LMM), 1998 WL 305648, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1998) (dismissing
complaint, holding that claims for missing luggage and delay in transportation
were time-barred by the Convention and that "wilful misconduct" allegation
would not preclude application of Convention's statute of limitations), affd, 173
F. 3d 848 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways 5 8 addressed the meaning
of "wilful misconduct" as used in Article 25 of the Warsaw Con-
vention under South African law, based on English Convention
interpretation. 159  The decision also illustrates the practical
proof problems ofttimes encountered by shippers. In Brink's
Ltd., a consignee of precious metals sued an air carrier to re-
cover for stolen cargo.160 In upholding the district court's find-
ing of insufficient evidence of "wilful misconduct" on the part of
the carrier or any of its agents (the plaintiff had no means to
prove how the alleged theft occurred, let alone that the carrier
or its agents knowingly converted the property or knowingly
failed to prevent the theft), the Second Circuit first noted the
dearth of applicable South African decisions interpreting Article
25's "wilful misconduct" language, and so looked to English
cases for guidance.1 61 Articulating the English standard that to
be guilty of "wilful misconduct" the actor "must appreciate that
he is acting wrongfully, or is wrongfully omitting to act, and yet
persists in so acting or omitting to act regardless of the conse-
quences, or acts or omits to act with reckless indifference as to
what the results may be," the court affirmed based on the failure
of proof.' 62 The consequence was limited liability for the carrier
of $1,520 related to a shipment allegedly valued at approxi-
mately $1.8 million. 163
158 149 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
159 See id. at 132-33.
-o See id. at 129.
161 See id. at 132-33 (citing Rustenberg Platinum Mines Ltd. v. South African
Airways, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 564, 569 (Q.B. 1977), appeal dismissed, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 19
(C.A. 1979) and Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 2 All E.R. 1016, 1022
(Q.B. 1952).
162 See id. at 133 (citing Horabin, 2 All E.R. at 1022).
163 See id. at 129, 132; see also Federal Ins. Co. v. Yusen Air & Sea Serv. (S) Pte.
Ltd., No. 97 Civ. 3830 (HB), 1998 WL 477987, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1998)
(granting carrier's motion for partial summary judgment, limiting liability for
$324,000 worth of lost integrated circuits to $380 pursuant to Article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention, and holding that waybill sufficiently incorporated KLM's
timetables, and thus "agreed stopping places," by reference); Southern Elec. Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Air Express Int'l Corp., 994 F. Supp. 1472, 1474, 1476-78 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (limiting liability for failure to deliver $182,000 worth of missing hard
drives to $5,297 under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, holding that "agreed
stopping places" were sufficiently identified in waybill via reference to readily
available timetables and despite the fact that ground carrier was not specifically
identified or its stops disclosed); Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de
C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d 508, 510, 512, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding air carrier's
agent's aircraft cleaning subcontractor was entitled to protection under the limi-
tation of liability provisions of Article 25).
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IV. NON-WARSAW AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
A. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT PREEMPTION
1. Preemption
In Smith v. Comair, Inc.,' 64 the Fourth Circuit held that a pas-
senger's claims against an airline for breach of contract, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
allegedly arising from the airline's refusal to permit him to
board his flight after a layover, were preempted by the Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA).165 The court found that all of the state
law claims were preempted because they related to the airline's
provision of a "service," namely the airline's boarding prac-
tices. 66 The court stated that to allow fifty states to impose dif-
fering standards on such claims would conflict with exclusive
federal regulation of airlines' "services," including boarding
practices; thus, "to the extent Smith's claims are based upon
Comair's boarding practices, they clearly relate to an airline ser-
vice and are preempted under the ADA.' 1 67 The court further
held that, to the extent they may not be preempted, the passen-
ger failed to state claims under Kentucky law for either false im-
prisonment or intentional infliction of emotional distress
because his allegations that the airline had flown him to an air-
port, stranded him there, lied to him and rudely failed to assist
him, did not state cognizable claims.16
The Second Circuit addressed ADA and federal aviation pre-
emption more generally in National Helicopter Corp. of America v.
City of New York. 6' National Helicopter Corp. involved the excep-
tion to preemption for "acts passed by state and local agencies in
the course of 'carrying out their proprietary powers and
164 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998).
165 See id. at 259; 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (stating that "[a] State ... may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect
of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier ...
166 See Smith, 134 F.3d at 258-59.
167 Id. at 259.
68 See id. at 259-60; cf. Guerrero v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1948
(SHS), 1998 WL 196199, *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1998) (granting carrier's motion
for summary judgment in an overbooking case involving the downgrading of a
passenger and his companion one class of service, based on the airline's tariffs);
Price v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231-36 (D. Vt. 1998) (holding that
claims for breach of carriage terms and to enforce Air Carrier Access Act of 1986
were not preempted by the ADA).
169 137 F.3d 81, 88-92 (2d Cir. 1998).
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rights. '" 170 The court held some of New York's permit restric-
tions upon a helicopter operator's operations at a City heliport,
such as curfews on and phasing out of some facility operations,
reasonable and within the noise and environmental areas prop-
erly regulated by local authority and thus not preempted. 171 It
also held other restrictions, such as route conditions on sight-
seeing flights and the banning of certain larger aircraft, unrea-
sonable or outside the scope of allowable local regulation (the
route conditions affected airspace control) and thus pre-
empted.1 72 As to the applicability of the exception, the Second
Circuit held that the factual allegations underlying the claim
were the proper focus of the preemption analysis.
17 1
2. No Preemption
Also addressing the preemption analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
in Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc.' 74 held that the district court had
improperly premised a Florida state law age discrimination
claim preemption finding on the relationship between the
plaintiff and former airline employee's alleged violent outburst
toward co-workers and the "service" of safety that an airline is
bound to provide.' 75 The carrier had compellingly asserted that
the former employee's threatening behavior related to the
"valid airline safety concerns." 176 However, the court found that
the complaint set forth a cause of action for age discrimination,
and the airline employer's alleged justification for its termina-
tion of plaintiffs employment could not be used as the basis for
its preemption argument. 7 7 The court concluded that it was
the airline's answer to the complaint that appeared to provide
the asserted ground for preemption, yet "it is the cause of action
170 Id. at 88 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (3)).
171 See id. at 90-91.
172 See id. at 91-92.
173 See id. at 89 (analyzing factual basis of allegations); see also Moayeri v. South-
west Airlines Co., No. C 97-101253 CW, 1998 WL 19472, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 7,
1998) (holding that claim of assault by airline boarding attendant was "related to
a service" and therefore preempted by the ADA); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of
Mass., Inc. v. Net Contents, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding
that wholesalers' tortious interference with business relations claim against air
freight carrier, based upon state statute, was related to air transport "services"
and thus preempted by the ADA).
174 141 F.3d 1463 (lth Cir. 1998).
175 See id. at 1466-68.
176 Id. at 1464-65.
177 See id. at 1466.
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and the underlying state law on which it is founded" that should
inform the preemption analysis."' 8 The court therefore re-
versed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs Florida Civil
Rights Act claim was preempted by the ADA.' 79
In Californians for Safe and Competitive Dump Truck Transporta-
tion v. Mendonca,i' ° the Ninth Circuit held that the California
Prevailing Wage Law (CPWL)181 was not preempted by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration Act (FAAA)' 8 2 as applied to the
trucking industry. The court held that:
Although CPWL is not entirely unrelated "to a price, route or
service of ... motor carriers," the teachings of recent Supreme
Court cases make clear that a state law dealing with matters tradi-
tionally within its police powers, and having no more than an
indirect, remote, and tenuous effect on motor carriers, are not pre-
empted. Such is the case here. Thus, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.18 3
The plaintiff dump truck association had sued several Califor-
nia agencies vested with statutory authority to enforce the
CPWL, arguing that the FAAA preempted the CPWL. The court
found unpersuasive the dump truck association's allegations
that its rates for "services" were based upon "costs, including
cost of labor.' s4 Instead, the court held: "We do not believe
that CPWL frustrates the purpose of deregulation by acutely in-
terfering with the forces of competition."'8 5 Thus, the court
found that the relatedness of the CPWL to a motor carrier's pro-
vision of services was insufficient for preemption to apply.1 8 6
Following the tenor of Californians for Safe and Competitive
Dump Truck Transportation, the Ninth Circuit in Charas v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,'87 "clarifying" its decisions in two prior cases,
wrote:
[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress intended to preempt only state
laws and lawsuits that would adversely affect the economic dereg-
ulation of the airlines and the forces of competition within the
178 Id.
179 See id. at 1465, 1467-68.
180 152 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1377 (1999).
181 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1770-80 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999).
182 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (containing preemption language identical to
that of the ADA).
183 See Mendonca, 152 F.3d at 1185.
184 Id. at 1187-89.
185 Id. at 1189.
186 See id.
187 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
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airline industry. Congress did not intend to preempt passengers'
run-of-the-mill personal injury claims. Accordingly, we hold that
Congress used the word "service" in the phrase "rates, routes, or
service" in the ADA's preemption clause to refer to the prices,
schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point trans-
portation of passengers, cargo, or mail. In the context in which
it was used in the Act, "service" was not intended to include an
airline's provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to
passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar amenities.188
The court thus expressly overruled its decisions in Harris v.
American Airlines, Inc.189 and Gee v. Southwest Airlines9' to the ex-
tent that those decisions were inconsistent with the opinion ren-
dered in Charas, and further confused inter-circuit law on the
issue."' The decision in Charas addressed several personal in-
jury cases arising from airline "services" such as the provision of
beverages, maintaining aircraft cleanliness, and passenger assist-
ance. Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Wolens 92 and Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.19 3
both of which addressed ADA preemption, and on the plain lan-
guage of the statute and the congressional intent in enacting the
ADA to achieve the economic deregulation of the airline indus-
try, the Charas court held:
We conclude that when Congress enacted federal economic de-
regulation of the airlines, it intended to insulate the industry
from possible state economic regulation as well. It intended to
encourage the forces of competition. It did not intend to immu-
nize the airlines from liability for personal injuries caused by
their tortious conduct. Like "rates" and "routes," Congress used
"service" in § 1305(a) (1) in the public utility sense-i.e., the pro-
vision of air transportation to and from various markets at vari-
ous times. In that context, "service" does not refer to the
pushing of beverage carts, keeping the aisles clear of stumbling
blocks, the safe handling and storage of luggage, assistance to
passengers in need, or like functions. We expressly overrule our
188 Id. at 1261.
189 55 F.3d 1472 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled by, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
190 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled by, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
191 Cf Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (finding no preemption of negligence-based personal injury claim and es-
tablishing Fifth Circuit "operation[s] [or] maintenance" test for determining
preemption).
192 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
193 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
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decisions in Harris and Gee to the extent that they are inconsis-
tent with this interpretation. 1
94
B. AIRLINE LIABILITy
1. Liability to Third Parties
In Pittman v. Grayson,195 the Second Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment n.o.v. entered in favor of a defendant airline in a case al-
leging the latter had conspired with the mother of a minor to
assist her in unlawfully taking the child out of the jurisdiction
contrary to court order." 6 Analyzing the issue under New York
law, the court held that there was insufficient proof to support a
jury finding that the airline had aided and abetted, interfering
with the father's parental custody. 197 In so holding, the court
found that New York law required that in order for the carrier to
be liable for acting in concert with a primary tortfeasor under
either a conspiracy or aiding and abetting theory, the carrier
had to have had knowledge that the tortfeasor (mother) was ille-
gally transporting the child.' 9 That the carrier had violated its
own prescribed procedures by allowing the mother and child to
194 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266; see also Lagrotte v. AMR Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-
1278P, 1998 WL 133140, at *2-6 (N.D. Tex. March 16, 1998) (holding that pilot's
wrongful termination claims were not preempted by the ADA or Railway Labor
Act, and thus remanding for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction); City of
Fort Worth v. City of Dallas, No. 4:97-CV-939-A, 1998 WL 50457, at *1-3 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 20, 1998) (holding that litigation regarding passenger service from
Love Field was not preempted by the ADA under 49 U.S.C. §41713(b) (3), relat-
ing to "proprietary powers and rights of airport owners and operators," and find-
ing no other federal question and therefore remanding); Luciano v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., NO. 96-CV-3999 (FB), 1998 WL 433808, *1-4 (E.D.N.Y. July 28,
1998) (holding that passenger's negligence claim arising from a slip and fall at a
security checkpoint was not preempted by the ADA, but granting motion for
summaryjudgment for lack of proof of causation or notice of a dangerous condi-
tion). Cf Air Transport Ass'n of America v. City and County of San Francisco,
992 F. Supp. 1149, 1180-88 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that ordinance which pro-
hibited the city from contracting with companies whose employee benefit plans
discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic
partners was preempted by the ADA only to the extent that the "potential cost or
other burden of bringing a carrier's benefit plans into compliance with the
otherwise-valid portions of the Ordinance is so great that air carriers will be co-
erced into changing their routes" and that the Ordinance did not "relate to ser-
vice . . .[or] to price" such as to be preempted by the ADA on those bases).
's 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 59, No.98-1940, 1999 WL
386633 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999).
196 See id. at 114.
197 See id. at 118-24.
198 See id. at 122-23.
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fly under names different from those on their reservations, and
also "falsified the weight-and-balance codes to disguise" the age
and gender of the persons traveling together, were insufficient
to impose liability.1 99 While this evidence supported the infer-
ence that the airline had assisted the mother, the carrier's only
notice of alleged illegality came from telephone calls from a
man whose identity was not documented, who made unverifi-
able representations that the mother's travel with the child was
restricted by court order. 20 0 The court concluded that "knowl-
edge that conduct is clandestine does not necessarily include
knowledge of its motivation or legality.
20 1
In C & S Acquisitions Corp. v. Northwest Aircraft, Inc.,2 °2 the
court held that a provision in an aircraft lease requiring the air-
line lessee to negotiate in good faith before renewing leases on
certain transport category aircraft was unenforceable as a matter
of Minnesota law as an agreement merely to negotiate in the
future.203 The court held that under the law of that state such
provisions are "not enforceable because [they do] not constitute
the parties' complete and final agreement."2 4
2. Liability to Employees
In Fredrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc.,20 5 a terminated airline pilot
brought an action against his employer and its parent and re-
lated companies for tortious interference with prospective eco-
nomic advantage and retaliatory discharge.20 6 Holding the
matter governed by Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit held that
the plaintiff had failed to allege any reasonable expectation of a
future business relationship, and thus failed to state a claim for
tortious interference. 20 7 The pilot had merely alleged that he
wished to continue working as a commercial airline pilot-he
did not claim that he had been offered ajob by any other airline
or even that he had interviewed for other positions which had
been denied him.208 With respect to the retaliatory discharge
199 See id. at 123.
200 See id. at 123.
201 Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 1998).
202 153 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1998).
203 Id. at 626.
204 Id.
205 144 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1998).
206 Id. at 502.
207 See id. at 502-503.
208 See id. at 503.
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cause, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a claim based
on the allegation that he had been discharged for "going pub-
lic" with concerns about the safety of an aircraft operated by his
employer.2 °9
In Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,21 ° the Second Circuit, address-
ing a former flight attendant's claims for alleged violations of
FAA drug testing regulations and of the Fourth Amendment,
held that there is no private right of action for violations of such
regulations and that as an at-will employee of a private company
the flight attendant could not maintain state, common law, or
procedural due process claims based on alleged wrongful termi-
nation.211 The court did, however, allow a Fourth Amendment
claim to stand based on the allegation that the airline's FAA reg-
ulatory drug testing was not randomly administered as constitu-
tionally required absent grounds for reasonable suspicion of
drug use.212
Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.213 held that a plaintiff airline em-
ployee "station agent" who suffered from multiple sclerosis
could not recover under the Americans with Disabilities Act 214
because she had not made the necessary primafacie showing that
she was "qualified," i.e., that she could perform the essential
functions of her work with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion.21 5 The evidence included admissions that the employee
could not assist passengers without help of her own, nor could
she perform other gate-related duties that involved
ambulating.21 6
A similar result was reached in Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 217
In Witter, the plaintiff, a commercial airline pilot, sued his em-
ployer and its medical consultants under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 218
and state tort law.219 Because the employer did not regard the
209 See id. at 505 ("No Illinois court has held that an employee forfeits his cause
of action for retaliatory discharge by complaining publicly rather than privately,
and this court will not take that step today." Id.).
210 147 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
211 Id. at 170-71.
212 See id. at 171-72.
213 147 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 1998).
214 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
215 147 F.3d at 786-88.
216 See id. at 787.
217 138 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1998).
218 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
219 138 F.3d at 1367.
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pilot as restricted in his ability to perform a "class ofjobs" due to
his alleged inability to fly because of mental or emotional
problems originating with a threat to commit suicide (he was
still deemed able to do jobs in a class other than piloting), the
district court's grant of summary judgment was affirmed.22 °
V. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS
A. LIABILITY TO THRD PARTIES
In Emory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,221 a widower sued the
manufacturer of a Navy jet fighter which had crashed and slid
into the decedent's vehicle, killing her.222 The district court en-
tered summary judgment for the manufacturer on the basis that
it had no duty to warn of the dangers associated with the jet
under Maryland law given the Navy's involvement in its design,
and that the manufacturer also had no duty toward any particu-
lar pilot.2 23 In affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment, the Fourth Circuit found, inter alia, that under Mary-
land law a manufacturer has no duty to warn of an open and
obvious danger.224 A manufacturer also does not have a duty to
warn under Maryland law "if the hazard is one which the plain-
tiff or other user has equal knowledge .. . The duty to warn
extends only to those who can reasonably be assumed to be ig-
norant of the danger. "225
The court then held that the Navy could not reasonably be
assumed to be ignorant of the dangers associated with one of its
fighters which crashed after its flight control system failed.226
The court noted that the Navy played a significant and instru-
mental role in the design and production of the jet and had
specific knowledge of possible flight control system failures and
of related precautions and responses. 227 Moreover, the Navy's
actual knowledge (or lack thereof) of specific dangers relating
to the aircraft was irrelevant to the manufacturer's duty to warn
where the Navy so extensively participated in the design and de-
220 See id. at 1370.
221 148 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1998).
222 Id. at 348.
223 See id. at 349, 352-53.
224 See id. at 350.
225 Id. at 350 (quoting Mazda Motor of Am., Inc. v. Rogowski, 659 A.2d 391,
395 (1995)).
226 See id. at 351-52.
227 See id. at 351.
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velopment of the jet.228 Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the
plaintiff could not maintain a claim against the aircraft manufac-
turer for failure to warn particular pilots about the allegedly un-
safe condition of the aircraft.229 Agreeing with the district court,
the court noted that "nothing in the case law suggests that a
military contractor is responsible for directly warning the indi-
vidual military personnel who fly the planes under military
command. "230
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Tate v. Boeing Helicopters,231 the court affirmed a summary
judgment entered for the defendant helicopter manufacturer
based on the "government contractor" defense.232 In reaching
its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit found that the defense would
apply to a failure to warn claim related to a helicopter's tandem
hook system, based on evidence that the government exercised
its discretion in approving warnings and was generally informed
about risks which may have contributed to the involved crash.23
The court held that a defendant asserting the "government con-
tractor" defense to a failure to warn claim need not establish
that the government review process relating to warnings specifi-
cally addressed the particular hazard which occurred: 234
The first condition [to the application of the rule] requires only
that the government exercise its discretion in approving the pro-
posed warnings. In the failure to warn context, discretion occurs
where the government is both knowledgeable and concerned
about the contents of the proposed warnings before granting its
approval. The government is sufficiently knowledgeable when it
has a complete enough understanding of the proposed warnings
228 See id. at 352.
229 See id.
2 4) Id. at 352 (noting that since the Navy possessed the same knowledge as its
contractor, a requirement that the contractor provide additional warnings to in-
dividual pilots risks disruption of the chain of Naval command: "[w]hether or
how those warnings are conveyed to individual Naval officers under military com-
mand seems beyond the scope of any duty appropriate to impose on the contrac-
tor." Id.); see also Lurzer v. AlliedSignal, Inc., No. 96 C 3845, 1998 WL 102637, *3-
6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1998) (granting judgment on the pleadings to the manufac-
turer of an aircraft engine turbocharger in an action arising from an engine fail-
ure during a flight over France for the plaintiff's failure to state a claim, on
limitations grounds, under the "economic loss rule," and for lack of privity).
231 140 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 1998).
232 See id. at 657-61.
2 3 See id. at 657-58.
234 See id. at 658.
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to reasonably recognize which hazards have been thoroughly ad-
dressed and which have not. The government is sufficiently con-
cerned when it demonstrates a willingness to remedy or require
the remedy of any inadequacies it finds in the proposed warn-
ings. Where government knowledge and concern are exhibited
through the review process, it may be fairly said that the govern-
ment has decided which warnings should and should not be pro-
vided to end users .... The second condition [for application of
the rule] requires only that the contractor provide warnings
which conform to warnings approved by the government.235
Finally, the court held that the manufacturer had satisfied the
third prong for "government contractor" insulation in the fail-
ure to warn arena by showing that it had "warned the United
States of the dangers in the equipment's use about which the
contractor knew, but the United States did not. "236
C. ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
The Third Circuit in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. General Elecrical
Co.237 evaluated the Supreme Court's decision in Saratoga Fishing
Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.238 as it relates to the "other property"
exception to the "economic loss rule." In Sea-Land Service, Inc., a
vessel owner brought tort claims against the manufacturer of a
diesel engine that included a replacement part (a rod) that was
defectively manufactured, failed, and caused damage to the en-
gine and lost profits while the ship was inoperable.2 39 The court
held that the engine, rather than the rod, was the "product" for
purposes of the "economic loss rule," and that therefore the ves-
sel owner's negligence and strict liability claims for damage to
the engine were barred, including damages for loss of use of the
vessel:
The law is clear that if a commercial party purchases all of the
components at one time, regardless of who assembles them, they
are integrated into one product .... Since all commercial par-
ties are aware that replacement parts will be necessary, the inte-
235 Id. at 658-59 (citing Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir.
1995) (finding that a manufacturer's manual approved by the Government was
identical to the manual actually provided to the flight crew of the crashed
aircraft)).
236 Tate, 140 F.3d at 660 (citing Tate v. Boeing Helicopters, 55 F.3d 1150, 1157
(6th Cir. 1995)).
237 134 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1998).
238 117 S. Ct. 1783, 1785-87 (1997).
239 134 F.3d at 151.
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grated product should encompass those replacement parts when
they are installed in the engine.2 40
Thus the owner's tort claims were barred; however, the court
held that "[f] or purposes of contract law, and consequently a
breach of warranty claim, Sea-Land is correct-the engine and
the rod are separate property, each subject to the terms of its
respective contract. '" 2 4
1
The Sea-Land court also addressed the question of whether
Sea-Land could state a negligence claim against the engine man-
ufacturer on the basis of either an alleged post-sale duty to warn
of a defective product, or allegedly negligent repair of the previ-
ously damaged engine.2 42 The court essentially held that Sea-
Land could have contracted with the manufacturer and thus al-
located any such tort risks "or [could] protect against a defect
through insurance," and thus denied both claims on the basis of
the "economic loss rule."243 The court did not disturb the gen-
eral rule that if the damage resulting from a defect is "other
than mere economic loss," then "all tort-based theories of recov-
ery including ... duty to warn" remain viable.244
The Seventh Circuit held in Rodman Industries, Inc. v. G & S
Mill, Inc. 241 that a boiler purchaser's negligence action against a
retrofitter of the boiler was barred by the "economic loss
rule. '246 The court held that "the main thrust of the deal was
the purchase of a retrofitted boiler" and thus rejected the pur-
chaser's claim that the "economic loss rule" would not apply to
an alleged services contracts.2 47 The court also rejected the pur-
chaser's "other property" argument, holding that damage to the
retrofitted boiler was essentially the same as the damage to the
original boiler, such that the original boiler could not constitute
"other property" separate from the retrofitted boiler. 48
240 Id. at 154 (citing Saratoga Fishing, 117 S. Ct. at 1785-88 and Exxon Ship-
ping Co. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Haw. 1993)).
241 Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 134 F.3d at 154.
242 See id. at 155-56.
243 Id. at 154-56.
244 See id. at 155 (rejecting McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp.
1520, 1523-26 (D.NJ. 1986)).
245 145 F.3d 940 (7th Cir. 1998).
246 Id. at 943-45.
247 Id. at 943 (noting the unsettled nature of Wisconsin law on the issue).
248 See id. at 945. But see Transco Syndicate #1, Ltd. v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.,
1 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611-13 (E.D. La. 1998) (holding that a replacement engine was
a product separate from a vessel).
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VI. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
A. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
1. Air Traffic Control Liability
In Jackson v. United States,249 the court addressed a Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 21° suit involving allegedly insufficient
weather information given to the pilot of a small plane by FAA
personnel. The pilot was killed when his plane crashed near
Charleston, West Virginia.2 51 The First Circuit held that the
FAA's decision regarding the dissemination of weather informa-
tion likely involved a "discretionary function," and that in all
events it had not been negligent and the pilot maintained pri-
mary responsibility for weather briefing and his related flight
planning.2 52
2. FTCA General Issues
In Bailey v. Illinois Freedom Militia Southern Zone,253 the court
denied relief sought by a petition for writ of mandamus and
summarily affirmed in an alleged Federal Tort Claims Act
case.254  The court held that the underlying allegations
amounted to no more than a claim that the Government had
improperly performed a civil rights investigation, which was a
wholly discretionary act for which the Government was immune
from suit.2 5
249 156 F.3d 230 (1st Cir. 1998).
250 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2671-2680 (1994).
251 See Jackson, 156 F.3d at 232.
252 See id. at 234-35; see also Management Activities, Inc. v. United States, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 1157, 1162-67 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that claims against the FAA
and air traffic controllers for wrongful deaths arising from a wake turbulence
accident were barred by the FTCA's "discretionary function" exception on the
basis that the prioritization of aviation risks is a matter of agency policy; also
holding that although not immune from suit, the controllers were not negligent
in failing to warn regarding wake turbulence because under VFR conditions pi-
lots, not controllers, bear primary responsibility to avoid wake turbulence
hazards). But see Barna v. United States, 22 F. Supp.2d 784, 785-87 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (denying application of the "discretionary function" exception to the
FTCA in a general aviation crash case where an issue of fact existed as to whether
the Government had considered charting certain trees located at elevation, as
required by IACC procedures).
253 No. 98-5094, 1998 WL 545425, *1-2 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 1998).
254 Id. at *1.
255 See id. at *1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680). But see Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 13 F.
Supp. 2d 371, 379-381 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding a plaintiff's claim that FAA in-
spectors had conspired to place blame on him for an aviation incident, resulting
in suspension of his license, did not involve judgment on the part of the inspec-
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In Kasim v. Republic Management Services, Inc.,25 6 the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court grant of summary judgment to the
United States on a personal injury claim arising from a trip and
fall in a Department of Housing and Urban Development
owned apartment complex. 257 The plaintiff's claims against the
United States revolved in part around allegations that it con-
trolled and supervised the acts of the apartment management
agency such that the government should be liable for the in-
jury.258 The court held that while the FTCA amounts to a "lim-
ited waiver of sovereign immunity and makes the United States
liable for money damages 'caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government,'- 259 it does
not provide a waiver of immunity with respect to the torts of
independent contractors working for the United States. 260 The
court found that "the government's establishment of detailed
regulations, its ability to compel [its agent's] compliance with
[those] standards, and its periodic inspections [of the agent,
were] insufficient to" deny the United States summary
judgment.261'
In White v. United States,262 the Fifth Circuit reversed a district
court's decision denying the United States' motion for a stay of
a Federal Tort Claims Act suit and the district court's entry of
judgment for the plaintiff-employee of the Department of the
Army. The appellate court found that a substantial question ex-
isted as to whether the Secretary of Labor would find that the
employee's claim was covered by the Federal Employers Com-
pensation Act (FECA),265 thus requiring the district court to
have stayed proceedings pending the determination of that is-
sue by the Secretary:
tors so that the "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA might provide a
liability shield; also holding that libel and slander claims were barred by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) because the Government has not waived its sovereign immunity for
such claims).
256 141 F.3d 1176, No. 97-15048, 15430, 1998 WL 166540, *1-2 (9th Cir. Mar.
31, 1998).
257 Id. at *1-2.
258 See id. at 1.
259 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
260 See Kasim, 1998 WL 166540, at *1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671).
261 See id. at *2 (citing Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 516 (9th Cir. 1983)
and Letnes v. United States, 820 F.2d 1517, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987)).
262 143 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
263 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1994).
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If, after remand, White presents his claim to the Secretary, and
the Secretary determines that FECA provides White's remedy,
then White must pursue the claim accordingly. If, however, the
Secretary finds no FECA coverage, White will be able to pursue
his claim under the FLCA in which case the district court is free
to reinstate the judgment. 264
B. REGULATORY CHALLENGES
1. Rulemaking and Findings Challenges
In Asiana Airlines v. Federal Aviation Administration,265 the court
held that under the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act2 66 the
FAA was not required to conform to Administrative Procedure
Act 2 6 7 notice and comment procedures in implementing fees for
services provided to airline flights neither taking off nor landing
in the United States. 268 The court further held the FAA also did
not violate any international aviation agreements when it
promulgated the interim final rule without a notice and com-
ment period because the alleged agreements did not themselves
provide for such periods, and the FAA held meetings with for-
eign carriers before promulgating the rule in all events.2 69 Addi-
tionally, the court found that the rule also did not violate such
international agreements by discriminating against foreign carri-
ers.270 Finally, the court found that the statute under which the
rule had been promulgated allowed the FAA to charge for in-
flight services provided to airline overflights regardless of
whether their flight paths took them over the United States (as
opposed to in its airspace), but that the agency exceeded its au-
thority when it based such fees, in part, on the value to the user
of the services instead of on the costs of providing them as re-
quired by law.271
In Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration,272 the court rejected attacks by air tour operators, Clark
County Nevada, a Native American tribe, and several environ-
mental groups to the FAA's 1996 final rule restricting overflights
264 White, 143 F.3d at 239.
265 134 F.3d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
266 49 U.S.C. § 45301 (1994).
267 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
268 See Asiana Airlines, 134 F.3d at 398-99.
269 See id. at 399.
270 See id.
271 See id. at 400-03.
272 154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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at Grand Canyon National Park.273 Tour operators claimed that
the rule failed to meet a federal statutory mandate to protect the
park's environment because it relied on acoustical measure-
ments rather than visitor surveys to define "natural quiet."274
The court found that the agency's definition and interpretation
of the term were reasonable and did not lead to an overly re-
strictive regulation. 75 Similarly, statutory language requiring
the FAA to create flight-free areas within the park did not re-
quire the agency to create completely noise-free areas, as argued
by the environmental groups.276 Finally, the court held that the
final rule also did not violate federal administrative procedure
requirements. Because the FAA was statutorily bound to accept
related Interior Secretary recommendations unless aviation
safety was adversely affected, the agency was not required to con-
sider tour operators' comments or to respond to them.277 In
sum, the court upheld the FAA's 1996 final ruling restricting
overflights in the park.
In Air Canada v. Department of Transportation,278 the court held
under the Airports and Airways Improvement Act 279 that several
carriers' petitions for review of agency orders issued by DOT
should be denied because the agency had not acted unreasona-
bly or inconsistently in finding that airport facilities to be built
in Miami and used primarily by one hub tenant were "compara-
ble" to those available to the complaining carriers, or when it
conditioned its finding that fees charged by the county in con-
nection with the renovations were reasonable on the county's
consistent application of its equalization methodology.280 The
complaining carriers' argued, in essence, that county-imposed
improvement fees amounted to an unfair subsidy to the hub ten-
ant. After stating that its review of agency action was limited to
an assessment for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of dis-
cretion, the court held that the DOT's findings as to compara-
bility of facilities and its condition that the county assess fees
based on the consistent application of its equalization methodol-
ogy once final costs were ascertained, were not unreasonable
273 Id. at 459-60.
274 See id. at 466.
275 See id. at 465-67.
276 See id. at 474.
277 See id. at 467-68.
278 148 F.3d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
279 49 U.S.C. § 47107 (1994).
280 148 F.3d at 1153.
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and thus were not subject to review. 21l The court also found
that imposing on the carriers the burden to show that the
DOT's action was unreasonable had not been unfair given that
the administrative proceedings were essentially a continuation
of a suit instituted by the carriers who had not shown prejudice
by virtue of the assignment of the burden. 82
In City of Los Angeles v. Federal Aviation Administration,283 the
court affirmed an FAA decision approving the Burbank-Glen-
dale-Pasadena Airport Authority's plan to expand and modern-
ize its terminal and related facilities, rebuking a challenge to the
agency's environmental impact statement.2 4 The Ninth Circuit
found that the FAA had taken the requisite "hard look" at the
environmental effects of the project as required under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act 285 and the California Environ-
mental Quality Act,286 and that the project was also "grand-
fathered" under Clean Air Act 2 7 legislation prohibiting agen-
cies from supporting projects that do not conform to a state's
environmental implementation plan.28 8 The court noted that in
the environmental review arena, the function of the court is not
to agree or disagree with the agency's conclusions but rather to
ensure that true environmental review had occurred.28 9
2. Certificate Proceedings
In Aerosource, Inc. v. Slater,29 the court, addressing an issue of
first impression, held that there was no appellate jurisdiction to
review the FAA's actions in issuing advisories regarding safety
concerns about repair work performed by a repair station. 9 1
The court found that the FAA advisories in question were not
final agency orders, and hence were not appealable, that an
281 See id. at 1151-53
282 See id. at 1155-56.
285 138 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1998).
284 Id. at 807-09.
285 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
286 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999).
287 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (1994).
288 See City of Los Angeles, 138 F.3d at 808-09.
289 See id. at 807. But see Chicago Tribune Co. v. FAA, No. 97 C 2363, 1998 WL
242611, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1998) (granting plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment under the Freedom of Information Act compelling the FAA to pro-
duce documents concerning in-flight medical emergencies on commercial
airlines).
p0 142 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 1998).
291 Id. at 576-81.
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agency letter to the repair station denying the latter's request to
rescind the advisories also was not a final agency action and as
such also was unappealable, and that the agency's refusal to re-
consider the rescission request denial also was not final or ap-
pealable. 9 2 The court's analysis of the lack of finality turned on
the fact that neither the advisories nor the other agency actions
were matters as to which "the agency has completed its decision
making process, . . . [which] is one that will directly affect the
parties. 293 In this case, the FAA's actions and conclusions were
tentative and indicative of an ongoing investigation. 294 They
also imposed no obligations, denied no rights, nor fixed or al-
tered any legal relationships.295
In Crist v. Leippe,296 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district
court's judgment dismissing a case brought by a pilot whose
commercial certificate was suspended by the FAA which asserted
constitutional tort claims based on the agency's alleged spoila-
tion of evidence. 297 After removal of the action by the FAA, the
district court had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.298 The Ninth Circuit found the dismissal errone-
ous, but also held that the pilot could not state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, and thus affirmed. 299 The court
held that the administrative proceeding underlying the claim,
which had found that the pilot had suffered no cognizable in-
jury, was in essence a bar to review in the district court.3 °
In Kraley v. National Transportation Safety Board 1 the court de-
nied mandamus relief to a pilot whose commercial certificate
suspension by the FAA pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (relating to
repeat motor vehicle actions involving drugs or alcohol) had
been upheld by the NTSB10 2 In denying relief, the Sixth Circuit
found, inter alia, that the involved regulation did not impose ar-
bitrary standards nor was it based on arbitrary findings or viola-
tive of due process, and that the FAA did not exceed its
292 See id.
293 Id. at 578 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992)).
294 See id. at 579-80.
295 See id. at 580-81.
296 138 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1998).
297 Id. at 802-03.
298 See id. at 803.
299 See id. at 804-05.
300 See id. at 805.
301 165 F.3d 27, No. 974227, 1998 WL 708705, *2-7 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1998).
302 Id. at *1.
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jurisdiction in sanctioning airmen for the violation of motor ve-
hicle laws.10 3
VII. INSURANCE
A. QUALIFICATION OF PILOTS
In Brown v. North American Specialty Insurance Co.,3 4 the Geor-
gia Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment granted to a
hull insurer which had denied coverage for loss of an aircraft
because the pilot was not licensed or qualified to fly it in IFR
weather conditions prevailing during the flight.30 5 The policy
exclusion at issue provided that the pilot of the insured aircraft
must be "licensed and qualified under federal.., laws and regu-
lations for all segments of the flight involved."30 6 The court re-
jected the insurer's argument that this language excluded
coverage if the pilot operated the aircraft in IFR weather condi-
tions during any segment of the flight, and instead found that
the exclusion was unclear and required construction as it ap-
plied to the pilot's decision to operate the aircraft in IFR
weather conditions prevailing at his chosen landing site." y
In the court's opinion, issues of fact remained as to whether
the pilot could have reasonably expected that the aircraft would
remain insured while he operated it in IFR conditions while at-
tempting to land, if he did so only to the extent required to
meet an in-flight emergency which could not have been reason-
ably avoided by compliance with FAA regulations. 0 8 It held that
a jury could conclude that, based on pre-flight weather brief-
ings, the pilot reasonably expected he would encounter VFR
weather conditions upon his arrival at his destination; that he
only unexpectedly encountered IFR weather conditions in the
area; that he had no reasonable alternative but to attempt to
land at the chosen airport; and that, considering all the relevant
facts, the attempted IFR landing constituted an unavoidable in-
flight emergency that would allow aircraft operation in IFR con-
ditions without an instrument rating.30 9
303 See id. at * 2-3.
304 508 S.E. 2d 741 (Ga. App. 1998).
305 Id. at 742.
306 Id. at 742-43.
307 See id. at 744-45.
308 See id. at 746 (noting a pilot-in-command's regulatory authority to deviate
during an in-flight emergency).
309 See id.
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B. SCOPE OF COVERAGE
In Avemco Insurance Co. v. Davenport,1 ' the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed a judgment holding that under California law an aircraft
liability insurance policy's exclusion of losses occurring when
the insured aircraft is modified but not certified by the FAA,
applied to a change in the design of an aircraft fuel system.311
The appellant in Avemco Insurance Co. had built an airplane and
obtained FAA certification of airworthiness.3 12 The certification
was conditioned on various operating limitations, one of which
was notification to the FAA in the event of any "major change"
as defined by federal regulation. 13 The applicable regulation
defined "major change" to include any change having an appre-
ciable effect on the "reliability, operational characteristics, or
other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the [air-
craft]."314 The appellant had made a series of changes in the
fuel system without notifying the FAA or obtaining recertifica-
tion. The accident occurred after the last of the changes.1 5
The court held that altering the method of delivering fuel to
the engine had an obvious and substantial effect on reliability,
operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting air-
worthiness. 16 The court found that each of the changes had
been major, that the policy exclusion was clear, and that Califor-
nia courts do not find ambiguity in exclusions that summarily
incorporate FAA requirements by reference. 17 Finally, the
court found that no duty to defend claims against the appellant
brought by other persons arising from the crash existed either-
noting that no duty to defend arises if the undisputed facts es-
tablish that the insured is not entitled to coverage. 1 8
310 140 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1998).
311 Id. at 842-43.
312 Id. at 841.
313 See id.
314 Id. at 842.
315 See Avemco Insurance Co., 140 F.3d at 84142.
316 See id. at 842-43.
317 See id. at 843.
318 See id. at 843 (citing Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d
1153, 1159 (1993)). But see Anderson v. Virginia Surety Co., Inc., 985 F. Supp.
182, 186-92 (D. Me. 1998) (holding on summary judgment that an aircraft in-
surer had a duty to defend its insured in a wrongful death action charging the
insured's negligence in the death of a customer attending an introductory para-
chuting course; also finding a violation of unfair claims practices statutes by the
insurer's having waited 11 months before indicating its refusal to defend or
indemnify).
